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Abstract
How much do cultural biases aﬀect economic exchange? We try to answer this question
by using data on bilateral trust between European countries. We document that this trust
is aﬀected not only by the characteristics of the country being trusted, but also by cultural
aspects of the match between trusting country and trusted country, such as religion, history
of conﬂicts, and genetic and somatic similarities. We then ﬁnd that lower bilateral trust leads
to less trade between two countries, less portfolio investment, and less direct investment, even
after controlling for the characteristics of the two countries. This eﬀect is stronger for goods
that are more trust intensive. Our results suggest that perceptions rooted in culture are
important (and generally omitted) determinants of economic exchange.
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Duke of Wellington
There are remarkable diﬀerences in the level of trust among European managers. When
asked to score fellow managers of diﬀerent countries on the basis of their trustworthiness their
responses implied the following ranking (where 1 is the best and 5 the worst):1
Great Britain France Germany Italy Spain
British view 1 4 2 5 3
French view 4 2 1 5 3
German view 2 3 1 5 4
Italian view 3 2 1 4 5
Spanish view 2 4 1 5 3
Among these managers there seem to be some common views: everyone ranks German
managers relatively high and Italian ones relatively low. There is also a “home-country bias”:
managers trust their fellow countrymen more than what managers from other countries rank
them. For instance, Italian managers rank themselves fourth in trustworthiness, while they
are ranked ﬁfth (last) by every other group. More surprisingly, there are some match-speciﬁc
attitudes. French managers rate British managers much lower than any other ones except the
Italians, which seems at odds with the ranking chosen by every other group. However, the
British managers reciprocate this attitude (as the Duke of Wellington’s opening quote seems to
suggest).
These facts are not peculiar to this dataset. As we will show, they are exactly replicated in
an independent and broader survey (Eurobarometer). In this paper, we use this larger dataset
to explain why the perception of trustworthiness diﬀers so greatly across Europe. We also use
it to explore the economic consequences of these diﬀerent perceptions.
To disentangle the country-speciﬁc components of trust from the match-speciﬁc ones we
regress bilateral trust on ﬁxed eﬀects for the country receiving trust (country-of-destination
ﬁxed eﬀects) and ﬁxed eﬀects for the country trusting (country-of-origin ﬁxed eﬀects). The
country-of-destination ﬁxed eﬀects capture the common view about the trustworthiness of a
1The survey was carried out by the 3i/Cranﬁeld European Enterprise Center on a total of 1,016 managers
(managing companies under 500 employees) from ﬁve major European Community countries: Great Britain (433
responses), France (127), Germany (135), Italy (185) and Spain (136). See Burns et al. (1993).
1country, which derive from the quality of the law and its enforcement. The country-of-origin
ﬁxed eﬀects capture possible systematic diﬀerences in the way diﬀerent populations answer the
survey.
We then try to explain bilateral trust, after controlling for the above ﬁxed eﬀects, with
diﬀerences in information and culture. We ﬁnd that geographical distance between two countries,
their proximity, and the commonality between the two languages have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
bilateral trust. By contrast, bilateral trust is negatively correlated with a country’s exposure
in the domestic newspapers of another country. Sharing the same legal origin (a variable that
could proxy both for information and for culture) has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
level of trust, as long as we do not control for the common linguistic root. Once we control for
linguistic root, the commonality-of-law eﬀect halves and becomes insigniﬁcant, suggesting that
most of the eﬀect comes from cultural commonalities.
As a ﬁrst pure measure for a country’s cultural tradition, we use commonality of religion.
Religion had (and still has) a great impact on what is taught in school and how it is taught.
Hence, we expect that two countries with the same religion tend to have similar cultures and
therefore will trust each other more. Indeed, we ﬁnd this to be the case. A pair of countries
where 90% of citizens share the same religion (e.g., Italy and Spain) has a level of bilateral trust
one quarter of a standard deviation higher.
To further measure cultural similarity between two populations we introduce two new vari-
ables. First, the genetic distance between two populations that - as Ammerman and Cavalli-
Sforza (1985) claim - reﬂects the history of invasions during the Neolithic Age and thus their
common linguistic and cultural roots. As DeBruine (2002) has shown in an experiment, people
trust people who look like them more than those who do not. We ﬁnd this to be true also in
our sample. A one standard deviation increase in genetic distance reduces the level of bilateral
trust by 1.8 standard deviations.
Second, we derive from Biasutti (1954) an indicator of somatic distance, based on the aver-
age frequency of speciﬁc traits (hair color, height, etc.) present in the indigenous population.
People trust more other people who look like them. A one standard deviation increase in so-
matic distance decreases trust by one quarter of a standard deviation. When we use both the
aforementioned variables, only the latter remains signiﬁcant.
Finally, to capture the eﬀect of more recent aspects of the cultural tradition, we use a
country’s history of wars. People’s priors can be aﬀected by their education and in particular
2by the history they study in school. For instance, Italian education emphasizes the struggles
that led to the reuniﬁcation of the country in the nineteenth century. Since the major battles
during this period were fought against Austria, Italian students may develop, as our data shows,
a negative image of Austrians. We ﬁnd that countries with a long history of wars tend to trust
each other less. France and England, which have a record 198 years of war (more than ten times
the average of 19) should exhibit a bilateral trust that is 0.7 of a standard deviation lower than
average, which fully accounts for the lower bilateral trust we observe between the two countries.
Once we establish the cultural roots of trust, we move to study the eﬀect of trust on interna-
tional trade and investments. Unlike Anderson and Mercouiller (2002), De Groot et al. (2004),
Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2006), Ranjan and Lee (2006), and Nunn (2007), who look
at the eﬀect of country level institutional variables (either for the importing or the exporting
country) on trade, we look at the eﬀect of a match-speciﬁc variable (bilateral trust) on trade
and investments.
We ﬁnd that a higher level of bilateral trust can explain cross country trade beyond what
extended gravity models can account for, even after controlling for the better estimates of
transportation costs suggested by Giuliano, Spilimbergo, and Tonon (2006). At sample means,
a one standard deviation increase in the importer’s trust toward the exporter raises exports by
10%. Consistent with a trust-based explanation, we ﬁnd that trust matters more for trade in
goods that Rauch (1999) classiﬁes as diﬀerentiated goods, which can vary greatly in quality.
We then instrument trust with its long-term cultural components (the commonality in reli-
gion and in ethnic origin) and obtain much larger coeﬃcients. In spite of the fact that we pass
the test of overidentifying restrictions, this diﬀerence suggests that culture is likely to aﬀect
trade through other channels besides trust.
We ﬁnd similar results when we analyze the pattern of foreign direct investments (FDI) and
portfolio investments. A country is more willing to invest in another (either directly or via the
equity market) when it trusts its citizens more. Not only do these latter results conﬁrm our trade
ones, but they also suggest that cultural eﬀects are not limited to unsophisticated consumers,
but are also present among sophisticated professionals such as mutual fund managers.
Our combined results suggest that cultural relationships aﬀect trust and are an important
omitted factor in international trade and investments. In this respect, our paper is part of a
new strand of literature that looks at the eﬀect of culture on economic and political outcomes
(Barro and McCleary 2003; Fern´ andez and Fogli 2007; Giuliano 2007; Guiso, Sapienza, and
3Zingales 2003, 2004a, 2006, 2008a, 2008b; and Tabellini 2007, 2008).
Since genetically similar countries trust each other more and, thus, can transfer technology
faster and more eﬀectively, our results explain the correlation between level of development and
genetic distance found by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). Finally, our results are validated in a
micro setting by Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2006), who ﬁnd that that venture capitalists
are more likely to invest in start-ups of countries they trust more.
In our attempt to explain several international exchange puzzles, our paper is similar to
Portes and Rey (2005). However, they do not consider trust as a key determinant, but diﬀerences




We obtain our measures of trust from a set of surveys conducted by Eurobarometer and spon-
sored by the European Commission. The surveys were designed to measure public awareness
of, and attitudes toward the Common Market and other European Community institutions (see
the Online Data Appendix for details). They were conducted on a representative sample of the
total population of age 16 (or 15 depending on the wave) and older: about 1,000 individuals per
country. The set of countries sampled varies over time with the enlargement of the European
Union: there were 5 in 1970 (France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany and Italy), when
the ﬁrst survey was conducted, and has grown to 17 in 1995, the last survey to which we have
access (besides the 5 countries above, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain, Northern
Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Austria are also included).
One distinct feature of these surveys is that respondents were asked to report how much
they trust their fellow citizens and how much they trust the citizens of each of the countries in
the European Union. More speciﬁcally, they were asked the following: “I would like to ask you
2Our paper is also related to Morse and Shive (2006), Cohen (2008), and Vlachos (2004). Morse and Shive
(2006) relate portfolio choices to the degree of patriotism of a country. Cohen (2008) shows that employees’
bias toward investing in their own company is not due to information, but to some form of loyalty toward their
company, which can easily be interpreted as trust. Both these papers, thus, illustrate one speciﬁc dimension
in which cultural biases can aﬀect economic choices. Our paper can be seen as a generalization of Rauch and
Trindade (2002). They ﬁnd that the percentage of ethnic Chinese in a country helps predict the level of trade
beyond the standard speciﬁcation. We show this result is not speciﬁc to ethnic networks. Any cultural barrier
(or lack thereof) signiﬁcantly impacts trade and investments.
4a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please
tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all.”
In some of the surveys, this same question was also asked with reference to citizens of a
number of non-European Union countries, including the United States, Russia, Switzerland,
China, Japan, Turkey, and some Eastern and Central European countries (Bulgaria, Slovakia,
Romania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Czech Republic). To ensure a relative degree of
homogeneity in trading rule and living standards, we restrict our analysis to the countries
belonging to the European Economic Area: European Union members plus Norway. These are
also the countries for which we have both the trust from and to, thereby making the matrix
quadratic.3
As in every survey, there may be some doubts about the way people interpret the trust
question. First, there is some ambiguity on how to interpret it. In a trust game, the level of
trust maps into the amount of money you are willing to risk. Here, this mapping is missing.
Second, we are concerned whether a high level of trust reﬂects a high trust in a generic citizen
of a diﬀerent country or a better ability to identify the trustworthy people in a diﬀerent country,
which translates into a higher willingness to trust them.
To address these doubts, in a separate survey we asked a sample of 1,990 individuals both
the question above and the two following ones: 1) “Suppose that a random person you do not
know personally receives by mistake a sum of 1000 euros that belong to you. He or she is
aware that the money belongs to you and knows your name and address. He or she can keep
the money without incurring in any punishment. According to you what is the probability (a
number between zero and 100) that he or she returns the money?” and 2) “How good are you
(very good, good, not very good, not good at all) in detecting people who are trustworthy?”
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008c). We ﬁnd that the ﬁrst question is highly statistically
correlated with the measure of trust used in this paper, while the second one is not (the sign is
actually negative, albeit not statistically signiﬁcant). Hence, these data provide evidence that
the reported level of trust reﬂects the subjective probability that a random person is trustworthy.
There can also be doubts on the external validity of this question. Glaeser et al. (2000),
for instance, raise doubts on the validity of the World Values Survey trust question (which is
similar to the one we use), by showing that it is not correlated with the sender behavior in
the standard trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). However, Sapienza, Toldra, and
3In the NBER working paper version we also considered the full rectangular matrix of trust.
5Zingales (2007) argue that the sender behavior in the trust game is not a good measure of trust,
because it is aﬀected by other regarding preferences. From the trust game we can derive a better
indicator of trust: the sender’s expectation about the receiver’s behavior. Sapienza, Toldra, and
Zingales (2007) show that the World Values Survey trust question as well as other similar trust
questions are strongly correlated with these expectations. Furthermore, in a sample of Dutch
households, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008c) ﬁnd a correlation between the answer to the
WVS question on trust and the decision to invest in equity. Thus, this survey-based measure
does have some external validity.
This World Values Survey-type of question measures generalized trust, the trust people
have toward a random member of an identiﬁable group (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
2004a; McEvily et al. 2006). This is diﬀerent from personalized trust, the mutual trust people
developed through repeated interactions (Greif 1993), which is more important in relational
contracts.
For our purposes, we ﬁrst re-coded the answers to the trust question setting them to 1 (no
trust at all), 2 (not very much trust), 3 (some trust), and 4 (a lot of trust). We then aggregated
responses by country and year computing the mean value of the responses to each survey.
Table I shows the average level of trust that citizens from each country have toward citizens
of other countries. There is considerable variation in the level of trust exhibited from one
country to another. The average level of trust ranges from a minimum trust of 2.13 (the trust
of Portuguese toward Austrians) to a maximum of 3.69 (the trust of Finns toward Finns).
Besides this variability, in Table I we ﬁnd the same three regularities found in the small
survey presented in the introduction. First, there are systematic diﬀerences in how much a
given country trusts and how much it is trusted by others (see the last row and last column of
Table I). For instance, Panel B shows the Portuguese and the Greeks are those who trust the
least and the Swedish those who trust the most.
To isolate these country speciﬁc factors we run the following regression:
(1) Trustijt = κi + λj +
n X
t=1
γtY eart + ǫijt,
where Trustijt is the trust of country i for country j in the survey done at time t, κi a country
of origin ﬁxed eﬀect, λj a country of destination ﬁxed eﬀect, and Y eart calendar year dummies.
6Since we are interested in trust across diﬀerent populations, we drop all the observations when
i = j.
In Figure I we report the ﬁxed eﬀects of the country of origin and the country of destination
relative to Ireland (the actual estimates are reported in the online Appendix). A Swedish
citizen trusts others 17% more on average than an Irish citizen and 27% more than a Greek
citizen. The least trusted population are the Italians (like in the introductory example), while
the most trusted ones are the Swedes. Interestingly, there is a correlation between trusting and
being trusted. Nordic countries are at the top of the level of trustworthiness and tend to trust
others the most. While not deﬁnitive proof, this fact suggests that people excessively apply the
level of trustworthiness of their own countrymen to people from other countries. This result is
also consistent with experimental evidence in Glaeser et al. (2000) and Sapienza, Toldra, and
Zingales (2007).
If all (or almost all) the variation in the data were explained by the attitude citizens of
a country have toward trust (being trusted), there would be little hope for relative trust to
be able to aﬀect the patterns of bilateral trade. However, country-of-origin ﬁxed eﬀects and
country-of- destination ﬁxed eﬀects explain only 64% of the variability in trust. There remains
a considerable portion to be explained with match-speciﬁc variables. The British, for instance,
tend to trust the French even less than they trust the Italians and the Spanish and much less
than they trust the Belgians and the Dutch. The French reciprocate by trusting the British as
much as they trust (little) the Greeks.
II What explains bilateral diﬀerences in trust?
In this section we try to explain bilateral trust with match-speciﬁc variables, after controlling for
country ﬁxed eﬀects. To avoid understating the standard errors due to repeated observations,
we follow Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2004) and collapse the data by averaging over
time the residuals of regressing trust on calendar year dummies. Hence, our regression will be
(2) ¯ Trustij = κi + λj + βXij + ǫij,
where ¯ Trustij is the residuals of regressing trust on calendar year dummies averaged over time
and Xij match-speciﬁc variables that we will describe momentarily.
7A Determinants of Bilateral Trust
Why countries should diﬀer in their trust toward the same population? One possibility is that
these variations are just noise and as such, it should not be correlated with any possible determi-
nants. Another possibility is that these variations arise from diﬀerences in the information sets:
more informed countries will have a better estimate whereas more poorly informed will have a
worse one. The alternative is that there might be some sort of bias: either in the perception
or in the behavior. The British might have a distorted view of French reliability or the French
might derive a special pleasure from breaching the trust of a British person. For the moment
we are going to collapse both these latter explanations, which are diﬃcult to separate, under
the term of “cultural determinants,” but we will return to this later.
A.1 Proxies for information
As measures of information, we use the geographical distance between the two countries, their
proximity, and the commonality between the two languages. The geographical distance between
two countries is the log of distance in kilometers between the major cities (usually the capital) of
the respective countries.4 We also add a dummy variable to indicate when two countries share a
common land border (Frankel, Stein, and Wei 1995). As measure of language commonality we
use an indicator variable equal to 1 if two countries share the same oﬃcial language.5 We use
the transportation cost estimates introduced by Giuliano, Spilimbergo, and Tonon (2006) as an
additional measure of distance. These transportation costs are measured using shipping compa-
nies’ quotes collected from Import Export Wizard (a shipping company providing transportation
quotes around the world.6
To measure the level of information the citizens of one country have about citizens of another,
we follow Portes and Rey (2005) and collect the number of times the country toward which trust
is expressed appears in the headlines of a major newspaper in country that expresses the trust.
In Factiva we searched the newspaper with the highest circulation for each country. For each
4This measure is from Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995). We also tried our regressions with alternative measures
of distance between two countries and the results did not change substantially. Speciﬁcally, we used distance in
radians of the unit circle between country centroids (Boisso and Ferrantino, 1997) and the great circle between
the largest cities (Fitzpatrick and Modlin, 1986).
5This variable is from Jon Haveman’s website: http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/
HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html.
6http://www.importexportwizard.com Speciﬁcally, we use the cost in U.S. dollars of transporting a 1000 kg
of unspeciﬁed freight type load (including machinery, chemicals, etc.) with no special handling required, using
the optimal combination of going through land and water to transport the goods.
8pair of countries i and j we recorded the number of articles in the newspaper of country i that
mentioned country j or its citizens in the headline. We divided this number by the number of
total news stories on foreign countries.7
In addition to these measures, we use the La Porta et al. (1998) classiﬁcation of legal origin
and construct a dummy variable equal to 1 when the legal system of two countries is derived
from the same legal family (i.e., French, German, Scandinavian, English). Commonality in legal
origin may in principle reﬂect the fact that citizens of countries having similar legal systems trust
each other more because there is less fear of the unknown. The legal tradition is likely to be very
highly correlated with a common heritage and other cultural variables. Thus, controlling for
common legal origin, we underestimate the potential eﬀect of culture in biasing the perception
of trustworthiness.
A.2 Proxies for culture
The ﬁrst proxy for culture is an indicator of religious similarity equal to the empirical probability
that two randomly chosen individuals in two countries will share the same religion. We obtain
this measure by taking the product of the fraction of individuals in country j and in country i
who have religion k and then we sum across all religions k (k = Catholic, Protestant, Jewish,
Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Orthodox, no-religion, other aﬃliation). To calculate this variable
we use the percentage of people belonging to each religious denomination from the World Values
Survey (see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales [2003]).
Although religious diﬀerences are rooted in past history, this history is relatively recent
(300–400 years) and could reﬂect some comparative advantage in trading. For this reason, we
resort to ethnic diﬀerences to capture deeper cultural roots. Much of the ethnic variation in
Europe reﬂects Neolithic invasions: two-thirds of Europeans descend from Asian invaders and
one-third from African invaders (Cavalli-Sforza 2000).8
To measure these ethnic diﬀerences, we use the genetic distance between indigenous popu-
lations as developed by Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza (1996).9 This measure is based on
7In Factiva we were unable to locate any newspaper from Greece and Finland. Hence, when we use press
coverage the size of sample drops.
8Giuliano, Spilimbergo, and Tonon (2006) claim that genetic distance is simply a proxy for transportation
costs, at least in the Neolithic Age. Historical transportation costs, however, are not identical to current ones.
Before the creation of several tunnels the Alps represented a formidable barrier to communication between Italy
and the neighboring countries. Hence, when we control for today’s transportation costs in the regressions, genetic
(or somatic) distance captures the historical transportation costs, which led to diﬀerent cultural enclaves.
9See also Menozzi, Piazza, and Cavalli-Sforza (1978).
9the existence of genetic or DNA polymorphism (a situation in which a gene or a DNA sequence
exist in at least two diﬀerent forms [alleles]). A simple example of polymorphism is the ABO
blood groups classiﬁcation. While ABO alleles are present in all populations, the frequency of
each allele varies substantially across populations. For example, the O allele is frequent in 61%
of African populations and 98% of American Natives populations. These frequency diﬀerences
in alleles hold true for other genes or DNA sequences, as well. As a ﬁrst approximation, Cavalli-
Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza (1996) derive a measure of the diﬀerences in the genetic composition
between two populations by summing the diﬀerences in frequencies of these polymorphisms.10
As an alternative measure of distance between two populations, we derive an indicator of
somatic distance, based on the average frequency of speciﬁc traits in the indigenous population
reported in Biasutti (1954). For height, hair color (pigmentation), and cephalic index (the ratio
of the length and width of the skull), Biasutti (1954) draws a map of the prevailing traits in each
country in Europe. For each trait, European Union countries fall into three diﬀerent categories.
For hair color we have “Blond prevails,” “Mix of blond and dark,” and “Dark prevails.” We
arbitrarily assign the score of 1 to the ﬁrst, 2 to the second and 3 to the third. When one’s
country somatic characteristics belong to more than one category, we take the country’s most
prevalent category. We then compute the somatic distance between two countries as the sum of
the absolute value of the diﬀerence in each of these traits (see online Appendix for more details).
Somatic and genetic distances are highly correlated (0.53). Hence, we will be able to use only
one at a time.
Besides proxies for cultural distance, both somatic and genetic distances can be interpreted
as measures of genetic dissimilarities. As DeBruine (2002) has shown in an experiment, people
trust people who look like them more than those who do not. Hence, these two variables might
proxy for a genetic element in trust, rather than for a cultural one. Either way, however, they
are a source of a potential bias that distorts an objective assessment of the trustworthiness of a
foreign population.
To capture these long term elements of culture, we also use a measure of linguistic common
roots created by Fearon (2003). It is based on a count of the number of common branches two
languages share in the language trees as reported by Ethnologue.11
10For a more detailed description of this measure see the online Appendix.
11http://www.ethnologue.com. Two languages that come from completely diﬀerent families have zero branches
in common, whereas (say) English and French have one branch in common because they are both Indo-European
but English is Germanic and French is Romance. Fearon (2003) argues that for a measure of cultural distance, the
move from zero to one common node is more meaningful than a move from, say, 5 to 6, so that a transformation
10As a last measure of culture we compute the number of years a country pair has been engaged
in a war between 1000 and 1970. Since “history is very much a mythical construction, in the
sense that it is a representation of the past linked to the establishment of an identity in the
present” (Friedman 1992), we reconstruct wars using today’s borders. Cultural formation at
school is a vehicle for prolonging the memory of facts that took place many years ago (this is
why we count wars over almost a millennium). Presumably, countries that have a long history
of wars and conﬂict will mistrust each other. As Table I shows, the clear tendency of the French
to trust the British less than any other country may reﬂect the 198 years these two countries
waged war against each other since year 1000.
The summary statistics of these variables are reported in Table II (Panels A, C, D, and E),
computed for the diﬀerent samples used in the paper.
B Empirical results
In Table III we report the results of our estimates on the determinants of trust according
to equation (2). Our dependent variable is average residual trust.12 Since in regression (1)
we removed the eﬀect of a country-of-origin factor and a country-of-destination factor, this
speciﬁcation tries to capture the match-speciﬁc factor that drives trust. To correct for potential
geographical clustering of our standard errors, all our OLS regressions report spatial corrected
standard error (Conley 1999).13
We start by regressing the average residual trust of country i’s citizens towards citizens of
country j on our proxies for diﬀerences in the information sets (column (1)). If familiarity breeds
trust, we should expect that distance and common language have a positive eﬀect on trust.
More information, however, allows us to make more precise inferences about other populations’
trustworthiness, which does not necessarily imply more or less trust on average.
Common language has a positive eﬀect on trust, but in the basic speciﬁcation this eﬀect is
not statistically signiﬁcant. By contrast, a greater distance between two countries reduces the
level of trust between them. One standard deviation increase in log distance decreases trust by
with “diminishing returns” is better than simply counting common nodes. So, we will use linguistic common
roots = # common nodes/(1 + # common nodes), though we also tried other speciﬁcations with similar results.
12We obtained similar results (not reported) when we use as dependent variable median trust or the percentage
of individuals trusting a lot.
13Since we have both the trust from France to Great Britain and from Great Britain to France, and all
the bilateral regressors for this pair of countries is unchanged, we need to assume that their residuals are not
independent. For this reason, in a previous version we clustered the standard errors at the pair-of-countries level,
with very similar results.
11one fourth of a standard deviation. The common border dummy has a negative sign, but it is
not statistically signiﬁcant.
In column (2), we introduce our cultural variables. The results show that cultural factors
are important overall. The three cultural proxies are jointly statistically signiﬁcant with an
F-test of 21.6. Countries with a long history of wars tend to trust each other less. France and
England, for example, that have a record of 198 years of war (more than ten times the average
of 19) should exhibit a bilateral trust that is 0.7 of a standard deviation lower than average,
which accounts for the lower bilateral trust we observe between them. Religious similarity has a
positive impact on trust, compared to a case where no common religion is shared, a match where
90% of the citizens share the same religion (e.g., Italy and Spain) raises trust by 15 percentage
points (corresponding to 40% of its standard deviation).
The coeﬃcient of somatic distance shows that citizens of one country tend to be more trusting
towards citizens of other countries that are somatically closer. A one standard deviation increase
in somatic distance lowers bilateral trust by one-quarter of a standard deviation. If we modify
our measure of somatic distance to include only diﬀerences in the more visible traits (hair and
height), the eﬀect is even stronger (not reported).
In column (3), we substitute somatic distance with genetic distance. The eﬀect is similar
but stronger. One standard deviation increase in genetic distance lowers bilateral trust by
1.8 standard deviation. When we introduce both in the regression (column (4)), the genetic
distance coeﬃcient drops dramatically and loses statistical signiﬁcance. This is not surprising
given the high correlation between these two variables. Since both are trying to capture the
same dimension, we will drop the least signiﬁcant of the two (i.e., genetic distance) from the
following regressions.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) document that in the United States diﬀerences in income
are important factors in explaining trust within a community. In column (5), we try to see
whether these ideas also apply to trust across communities (or countries) by inserting the relative
diﬀerence in gross domestic product per capita as an additional regressor. Conﬁrming Alesina
and La Ferrara (2002), this variable has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on trust, but
its insertion does not change the magnitude of the coeﬃcients of the other variables substantially.
Another possibility is that our cultural variables are a proxy for diﬀerences in the legal
origin. If countries with a similar legal system understand each other more and trust more, it is
ambiguous whether this is an information eﬀect or a cultural eﬀect. For this reason, in column
12(6), we introduce an indicator variable equal to one if two countries have the same legal origin.
Not surprisingly, this variable has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. Countries with a
common legal origin have a one-fourth of a standard deviation higher trust. This eﬀect reduces
the impact of two of the other three cultural variables (religion similarity and somatic distance),
but they remains statistically signiﬁcant.
Another variable that may proxy for culture, but may also proxy for ease in (verbal) com-
munication is the commonality in linguistic roots. When we insert it in column (7), we ﬁnd that
it has a positive but not statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. Interestingly, commonality of linguistic
roots reduces the eﬀect of common legal origin (which becomes insigniﬁcant), but does not aﬀect
the other cultural proxies, which remain statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, even when we control for
variables that, at least in part, proxy for culture, our cultural variables retain an economically
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Giuliano, Spilimbergo, and Tonon (2006) claim that genetic distance is just a proxy for
transportation costs, which are mis-measured by the log distance between two countries. If this
were the case, trust might simply be the result of trade, with little or no cultural eﬀect. To
address this concern, we add transportation costs to the regression (column (8)). Transporta-
tion costs have a negative eﬀect on trust, but this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. More
importantly, the coeﬃcients of all the other variables (in particular, somatic distance) are not
aﬀected. This result is not speciﬁc to somatic distance; with genetic distance, we reach similar
conclusions.
Finally, in column (9) we introduce a direct measure of the knowledge that citizens of country
i have regarding the citizens of country j, as measured by press coverage. The coeﬃcient
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. The most likely interpretation of this result is that
newspapers tend to report bad news and this creates a negative bias, which is stronger when
more news about a country are reported. All the other results remain the same.
III The Eﬀect of Trust on Trade
Now that we have a better sense of the determinants of bilateral trust we can explore its
eﬀects. Is it true that trust (or lack thereof) has ﬁrst order economic eﬀects, as suggested by
Arrow (1972)?14 More importantly, can we establish that some cultural factors impact economic
14For a simple model of how small diﬀerences in trust can have ﬁrst order eﬀects on economic decisions see
section I of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004b).
13exchange? To do so, we try to see what the eﬀect of trust is when inserted in traditional models
of economic exchange across countries. We start with trade of goods and services.
A Data
The ﬁrst variables we use is data on trade of goods and services assembled by Statistics of
Canada. The World Trade Database is derived from United Nations COMTRADE data; its
advantage over other datasets is that it provides bilateral trade statistics at the 4-digit Standard
International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC) level.15 This database provides a time-series of trade
value, disaggregated according to trading partner and 4-digit SITC level for the period 1970–
1996. Of this long panel we only use data for the years that trust survey data are available
(1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, and 1996). The sample statistics for the data are
reported in Panel C of Table 3.16
B Empirical Results
Table IV estimates the eﬀect of trust on the amount of trade between two countries according
to the following model:
(3) LogExportjit = κi ∗ Y eart + λj ∗ Y eart + βTrustijt + δXij + ǫijt,
where exportjit is the export of country j in country i in year t aggregated over 4-digit SITC
industries. Trustijt is the trust of citizens of country i for citizens of country j in the survey in
year t, and Xij bilateral speciﬁc variables, which do not vary over time such as distance. κi a
country of origin ﬁxed eﬀect, λj a country of destination ﬁxed eﬀect, and Y eart calendar year
dummies.
De facto, regression (3) is a standard gravity regression (e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop
[2003]), with the addition of our measure of trust of the importing country toward the exporting
one, the Giuliano, Spilimbergo, and Tonon (2006) measure of transportation costs, country ﬁxed
15We also used an aggregate OECD dataset, based on custom data, and found very similar results.
16In a robustness test, as a dependent variable we used the log of the average level of export in the years
following each survey: 1970–1974 with the 1970 survey, 1975–1979 with the 1976 survey, 1980–1984 with the 1980
survey, 1985–1988 with the 1986 survey, 1989–1991 with the 1990 survey, 1992 with the 1992 survey, 1993 with
the 1993 survey data, 1994 with the 1994 survey data, and 1995–1996 with the 1996. The results (available from
the authors) are unchanged.
14eﬀects both for the importing and the exporting countries, and calendar year dummies. Follow-
ing Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) we insert ﬁxed exporter-by-year and importer-by-year
ﬁxed eﬀects to account for time-variant frictions. 17 Since we are looking at European countries
and aggregate the statistics at the country level we do not have any zero ﬂow observations,
which could bias the estimates (Linders and de Groot (2006)).18 The standard errors reported
in brackets are corrected for spatial correlation (Conley 1999).
As in the standard gravity equation, a greater distance between two countries negatively
aﬀects the level of exports, while the presence of a common border and of a common language
positively aﬀects it. All these eﬀects are highly statistically signiﬁcant. As in Giuliano, Spilim-
bergo, and Tonon (2006), the transportation costs measure has a negative eﬀect on trade, which
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.19
After controlling for all these variables, our measure of trust has a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade. The eﬀect is also economically very large. One standard deviation
increase in trust increases exports to a country by 10 percentage points, equal to 1.6 standard
deviations.
In column (2), we test the robustness of this result to the insertion of an indicator variable
for commonality of legal origin. This variable can capture the fact that similar institutions
foster more trade because they provide more guarantee to the parties involved (De Groot et al.
2004; Vlachos 2004). Alternatively, it can capture part of the cultural eﬀect. This indicator
variable has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade. Countries with the same legal
tradition trade among themselves 1.5 times more. We ﬁnd a similar eﬀect when we introduce
the commonality of linguistic roots, which does not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on
trade (column (3)).
Another possible objection is that trust might pick up some other cultural similarities such
as commonalities in taste. If two countries share the same taste for consumption (for example,
for cheese), they might trade more. To address this problem we construct an index of similarity
in consumption patterns across countries. This index is calculated computing domestic con-
17Our results are even stronger if instead of the interaction terms we include exporter ﬁxed eﬀect, importer
ﬁxed eﬀect, and year ﬁxed eﬀect (see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales [2004b]) Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
argue against the insertion of “remoteness” into the gravity equation. Our results are unchanged if we add a
measure of remoteness.
18For a theoretical justiﬁcation of the use of the gravity equation see Helpman and Krugman (1985).
19In an unreported regression, we also controlled for the geographical barriers used by Giuliano, Spilimbergo,
and Tonon (2006): the presence of a common sea and the presence of a mountain chain between two countries.
These variables are not signiﬁcant and do not aﬀect the other results.
15sumption as the sum of gross domestic production in each ISIC code plus imports and minus
exports between 1989 and 1994. For each pair of countries, then, we compute the correlation in
consumption across ISIC sectors.20
When we insert this variable in the OLS speciﬁcation of our trade regression (column (4)),
the sign is negative, but not statistically signiﬁcant. The size and the statistical signiﬁcance of
the coeﬃcient of trust are unaﬀected. A similar concern is that countries with a more similar
structure of production trade with each other more. To address it, we create an index of
production similarity by correlating the GDP data across sectors in the same way as described
above. The results (not reported) are unchanged.
There are at least three reasons to worry about these ordinary least squares results. First,
while it is possible that trust fosters trade, it is equally possible that trade breeds trust. The
second problem is that bilateral trust can capture the eﬀect of other omitted variables (for
example the existence of established trading outposts, as suggested by Rauch and Trindade
[2002]). Finally, measurement errors in the trust variable may aﬀect our results.
To address these concerns we instrument our trust variable by using the generalized method
of moments estimator (GMM-IV), which allows for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. As
instruments we use the cultural determinants of trust (commonality of religion and somatic
distance). Note that these instruments are time invariant, yet the average level of trust varies
over time. These two instruments pass the Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions, but
were we to add also the history of wars, the test would fail.
The IV estimates are presented in column (5). Not only trust retains its eﬀect on trade,
but the size of the coeﬃcient increases four-fold. A possible explanation is that our instruments
may be only weakly correlated with trust. If this is the case, then the two stage least squares
regressions will be biased and the standard errors misleading. To address this concern, we
compute the F statistics for the joint hypothesis that the instruments’ coeﬃcients are zero in
the ﬁrst stage regression and report it at the bottom of the table. In this speciﬁcation, the
F-test is 59.66, comfortably above the threshold recommended by Stock and Yogo (2002).
An alternative explanation for the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient is that our trust measure is a
noisy measure of the true trust between two countries and the increase in the coeﬃcient would be
the result of a reduction in the standard attenuation bias present when variables are measured
20Data on consumptions are calculated extracting data from the following dataset http://econ.
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:21085384~pagePK:64214825~piPK:
64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html
16with error. If this is the case, the true economic eﬀect is closer to the GMM-IV estimates, which
suggests a much larger result. One standard deviation increase in trust increases export to a
country by 63 percentage points. The magnitude of this eﬀect is not very diﬀerent from the one
found by Rauch and Trindade (2002). They ﬁnd that the presence of ethnic Chinese networks
increases the amount of bilateral trade in diﬀerentiated goods by 60%.
Alternatively, it is possible that – test of overidentifying restrictions notwithstanding – our
instruments are not orthogonal to trade, but pick up a set of cultural, institutional, and legal
connections that facilitate trade ﬂows. These cultural eﬀects must be match-speciﬁc since the
institutional factors are controlled for in the country-of-origin or in the country-of-destination
ﬁxed eﬀects. If this is the case, our results suggest the importance of cultural speciﬁc factors
in trade relationships. These factors can help explain the famous Rose (2000) result (conﬁrmed
by Rose and Stanley [2005]) that currency unions are associated to a very large increase in
trade. Since most of the countries belonging to currency unions in the Rose (2000) sample were
countries very culturally connected, where trust is higher, trade will be naturally higher once
the obstacle to trade imposed by national currencies is removed.
In the last column of Table IV, we test whether the impact of trust on trade varies according
to what theory would suggest. Our hypothesis predicts that trust should matter more for goods
whose quality can diﬀer more. For these goods, contracts are more diﬃcult to write and hence
they are more likely to leave gaps, where trust plays a very important role. Rauch (1999)
distinguishes between goods traded in an organized exchange, goods with a reference price, and
diﬀerentiated goods. Clearly, goods can be traded in an organized exchange only if they are
very homogenous in quality. Similarly, they can have a reference price, only if they are not too
dissimilar in their intrinsic quality. Hence, Rauch’s (1999) classiﬁcation can also be interpreted
as a classiﬁcation of the degree of trust-intensiveness of the diﬀerent goods.21
For this reason, in the last column of Table IV, we aggregate exports for two sub-sample
of industries (organized exchange and diﬀerentiated goods), then, we run the regression by
using the interaction between trust and whether the good is classiﬁed as a diﬀerentiated good.
The eﬀect of trust appears to be economically and statistically indistinguishable from zero for
the sample of homogenous goods, which are traded in organized exchanges. By contrast, the
eﬀect is quantitatively large and statistically diﬀerent from zero (and from the coeﬃcient for
21Rauch (1999) made a “conservative” and a “liberal” classiﬁcations of industries. To minimize ambiguity we
excluded industries that were classiﬁed in diﬀerent ways under the two classiﬁcations and run our regressions
only for organized exchange goods and diﬀerentiated goods.
17homogenous goods) for diﬀerentiated goods: trade in diﬀerentiated goods increases by 39% in
response to a one-standard deviation increase in trust.
IV Foreign direct investment
If trust has an impact on trade, it should have an even a bigger impact on the willingness to
invest in a country. For this reason, we study the impact of trust on foreign direct investments
(FDI).
A Data
Statistics on FDI transactions and positions are based on the database developed by the OECD
Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Aﬀairs. These statistics are compiled according
to the concept used for balance of payments (ﬂows) and international investment positions
(stocks) statistics. We only use data for countries that belong to the European Economic Area
for the years when trust survey data are available (1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994,
and 1996).
According to the classiﬁcation used in the balance of payment accounts, a foreign direct
investment enterprise is an incorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor (a resident of
another country) has at least 10% of the shares or voting power. As for trade, we restrict our
attention to EEA country members, where the same rules for FDI apply. Summary statistics
are reported in Table II, Panel D.
B Empirical Results
Table V reports the eﬀect of country i’s trust towards people of country j on the foreign direct
investments of country i in country j. The speciﬁcation is as in regression (3) except that the
dependent variable is the log of the stock of FDI from country i to country j. Spatial standard
errors are reported in brackets.
Column (1) reports the basic speciﬁcation where, in addition to mean trust, we have country
ﬁxed eﬀects, border, language, distance, and press coverage.22 The impact of trust is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. One standard deviation increase in trust raises the level of FDI by
22Since number of years at war was signiﬁcant in the trade regressions, we also inserted it here. Dropping it
does not impact the signiﬁcance and the magnitude of other results.
1827%. This result is robust to adding an interaction between the importer and exporter country
ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies (not reported).
In column (2), we insert the Giuliano, Spilimbergo, and Tonon (2006) measure of trans-
portation costs. Transportation costs should not have a direct eﬀect on FDI, but could have
an indirect one. Transportation costs act as a barrier to trade, which might induce direct in-
vestment as a substitute to export. Alternatively, transportation costs might act as a proxy for
other cultural barriers not captured by our measure of trust. There is also another, economic
not cultural eﬀect that goes in opposite direction: the larger transportation costs, the larger the
FDI monitoring costs. By contrast, common legal rules facilitate FDI monitoring and reduces
the importance of transportation costs. Transportation costs have a negative coeﬃcient, which
is borderline statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level, suggesting that the second interpretation
is more likely. When we introduce transportation costs, the eﬀect of trust drops by 30% and
becomes statistically insigniﬁcant at conventional levels.
However, when we introduce an indicator variable for common law origin (column (3)), the
coeﬃcient of transportation costs drops almost to zero and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant
(suggesting that it was a proxy for some cultural eﬀect), while the eﬀect of trust returns sig-
niﬁcant, but only at the 10% level. Countries with the same origin of the law have more than
four times the level of FDI in each other. This result is consistent with Bottazzi, Da Rin, and
Hellmann (2006), who ﬁnd that venture capitalists are more likely to invest in start ups of
countries they trust more. The picture remains unchanged when we control for commonality of
linguistic roots (column (4)).
Finally, in column (5) we report the IV regression where we use religion similarity and
somatic distance as instruments. When we do so, the coeﬃcient of trust increases dramatically
and is highly statistically signiﬁcant. As reported in the table, these two instruments pass the
Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions. It is not surprising that the magnitude of the
impact of trust on FDI is twice as large as the impact on trade. Since FDI are long-term
investments, they are more subject to contract incompletness than any other trade, even the
trade of diﬀerentiated goods. As such, they should be very trust intensive. Nevertheless, the
large diﬀerence between OLS estimates and IV ones is worrisome. In principle, it could be a
problem of weak instruments. However, the F-test on the coeﬃcients of the instruments in
the ﬁrst stage regression is equal to F(2,328) = 24.34. Alternatively, it could be due to the
fact that other cultural factors, correlated with religion similarity and somatic distance, greatly
19aﬀect FDI. In this later case, this result suggests that cultural relationships are an important
omitted factor in FDI investments.
V International Portfolio Diversiﬁcation
Finally, we investigate whether trust aﬀects also the pattern of portfolio investments. By con-
struction, portfolio investments involve investments in minority positions in foreign companies.
Hence, if we do ﬁnd evidence for the eﬀect of trust, we cannot attribute it to selective behavior
by the citizens of the country hosting the investment. If French derive a special pleasure from
hurting Brits, they will be unable to do it selectively when the Brits have invested in a minority
position because their actions would mostly aﬀect the other investors, who represent the vast
majority and are unlikely to be Brits.
This is a very demanding test, because the eﬀect of trust on portfolio allocations is likely to be
small for two reasons. First, most portfolio investments are in traded securities that are heavily
monitored and regulated, where the risk of misappropriation is somewhat limited. Second, we
have data only for portfolio allocations of mutual funds, which are run by sophisticated managers
less likely to be subject to this type of biases.
A Data
Ideally, we would like to have data on the international diversiﬁcation of individual investors;
however, these data are not available on a consistent basis. Hence, we resort to portfolio data
from institutional investors.
The data we use is from Morningstar, which kindly provided us with the geographical break-
down of equity investment of European mutual funds disaggregated by country of origin. We
exclude funds located in Luxembourg and Ireland when they are aﬃliated with companies lo-
cated in other European countries.
This dataset includes all funds that report their positions to Morningstar (including balanced
and ﬂexible funds, for example). Note that bonds investments are not included. Sample statistics
are reported in Panel E of Table III.
20B Empirical Results
Table VI reports the empirical results. The dependent variable is the percentage of the equity
portfolio of mutual funds located in country i that is invested in equity of country j, where i  =
j.
In a traditional portfolio model, the only explanatory variables would be the inverse of the
covariance of stock market returns and the weight of the country i ’s stock market in the world
portfolio. Since we include country ﬁxed eﬀects (and the data are just one cross section), this
latter variable is absorbed by them. The benchmark model would have only the inverse of the
covariance of stock market returns as explanatory variable.
To this benchmark, we add the standard proxies for information: a dummy for common
borders, a dummy for common language, the logarithm of the distance between the two capitals
plus our trust variable.
As column (1) (Table VI) shows, of all the traditional proxies for information only the
distance is signiﬁcant with a negative sign. The degree of trust country i has toward country j
has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the percentage of equity invested by country
i in country j. One standard deviation increase of the trust of people in country i toward people
of country j increases the portfolio share of country i in country j by 3 percentage points, which
corresponds to an 88% increase in the mean share. This result is robust to adding an interaction
between the importer and exporter country ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies (not reported).
In column (2), we introduce Portes and Rey’s (2005) measure of press coverage, which
represents a proxy for information.23 As in Portes and Rey (2005), the eﬀect of press coverage is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Needless to say, this correlation could reﬂect the incentives
that national press has in reporting information about countries where national investors invest
more. Controlling for this additional variable does not reduce the eﬀect of trust. In fact, the
estimated coeﬃcient is larger and remains statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, in spite of the
loss of observations.
In column (4), we control also for common origin of the law. Not surprisingly, this variable
has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the portfolio investments. This eﬀect is very
strong: on average, a country invests 8 percentage points more in the equity of another country
23We also try a speciﬁcation with the other control variables present in Portes and Rey (2005): telephone
traﬃc and foreign bank branches. Unfortunately, the overlap between the two samples is small (6 countries) and
even trying to integrate it we end up with only 78 observations. In such a regression, the coeﬃcient of trust is
quantitatively similar, but loses statistically signiﬁcance.
21if they share the same legal origin. As for trade and FDI, the eﬀect of commonality of legal
origin captures some of the eﬀect of trust and the coeﬃcient of trust drops to a third. In this
case, it also becomes statistically insigniﬁcant.
As previously discussed, the eﬀect of commonality of law is at least in part a cultural eﬀect.
To separate the cultural aspect from the familiarity component, we follow Vlachos (2004) and
construct an index of similarity in security law based on the work of La Porta, L´ opez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2006). This measure is computed as the sum of the absolute diﬀerence between
the score in the 21 dimensions of the security law analyzed by La Porta, L´ opez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2006). If common law captures the similarity of legislation, the eﬀect should be
captured by the distance in security law.
As column (4) shows, distance in security law has a positive (not negative as expected) eﬀect
on portfolio investment and this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. When we control for this
measure, the eﬀect of trust returns signiﬁcant and strong. Hence, commonality of law was in
part capturing the eﬀect culture has on trust.
This interpretation is further supported by the results in column (5). When we introduce
commonality of linguistic roots, the eﬀect is positive and statistically signiﬁcant and the eﬀect
of trust is reduced by one third, but still retains statistical signiﬁcance.
In column (6), we instrument our measure of trust with commonality of religion and somatic
distance and the coeﬃcient of trust more than doubles. As in the previous cases, this change
cannot be attributed to weak instruments (the F-test on the coeﬃcients of the instruments
in the ﬁrst stage regression is equal to F(2,64) = 13.53) and the two instruments pass the
Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions. Thus, either the true eﬀect is obscured in the
OLS regression by measurement errors or the instruments are capturing some other cultural links
that aﬀect also portfolio investments. Either way also these results point to the importance of
trust and cultural links as important and generally omitted factors in portfolio investments.
Overall, these results suggest that an increase in trust has an economically and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of trade, direct investments, and portfolio investments. In most of
our analysis, we have referred to these eﬀects as cultural eﬀects because we could not distinguish
among three explanations. In other words, British expectations about French trustworthiness
may reﬂect a cultural bias of the British. Alternatively, they could reﬂect a cultural idiosyncrasy
of the French who enjoy treating the British in a diﬀerent way. Finally, they could be the result
of a bad equilibrium where French misbehave more with the British because the British expect
22them to do so. The latter explanation ﬁnds support in an experiment, where people are shown to
be less likely to behave in a trustworthy way when they are communicated that their opponents
have low expectations about their level of trustworthiness (Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales
2008). Hence, British mistrust may be self-fulﬁlling.
When we talk about trade and foreign direct investments, all three explanations are equally
plausible. For portfolio investment, however, the latter two explanations are implausible. French
companies cannot hurt British investors independently of German or Italian ones. Consequently,
when we ﬁnd that the level of mistrust leads the British to invest less in France, it is not because
the French behave diﬀerently toward them, but because Brits have a biased perception of the
trustworthiness of French people.
VI Conclusions
In this paper we show that trust among European countries diﬀers in systematic ways, which are
correlated to their diﬀerent cultural heritages. Even after controlling for a country’s institutional
characteristics and for diﬀerences in the information sets, historical and cultural variables aﬀect
the propensity of the citizens of one country to trust the citizens of another country.
These diﬀerences in trust seem to have economically important eﬀects on trade, portfolio
investments, and foreign direct investments. These macro results are conﬁrmed in a micro study
by Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2006). They ﬁnd that the trust of a venture capitalist’s
country toward another country positively aﬀects his propensity to invest in a start up of that
country.
Note that both these results are obtained within the boundaries of the old European Union,
which comprises fairly culturally homogenous nations. Given that culture represents an impor-
tant barrier to integration even inside the old European Union, its eﬀect might be much larger
on world trade.
Cultural diﬀerences might also explain why Rose (2000) ﬁnd that historically currency unions
have boosted trade by 235%, while Baldwin (2005) ﬁnd that the Euro currency union increased
trade by only 9%. The unions studied by Rose (2000) are among countries with very close
cultural roots, such as Belgium and Luxembourg. By contrast, as this paper documents there
are still important cultural barriers within the European Union.
While our results are suggestive that these eﬀects can be economically important, they do
23not allow us to derive any welfare conclusion. First, we identify these eﬀects by looking at
within-country variations. As a result, our methodology cannot identify the impact of the av-
erage level of trust on the total volume of trade and, subsequently, the welfare implications of
our results. If we assume that the eﬀect estimated using within country variations applies also
between countries, then we have that the British perception of the trustworthiness of Dutch and
French makes them trade 30% more with the former than with the latter. Second, we document
only eﬀects on quantities not on welfare. If it is costless for British to substitute French cheese
with identical cheese coming from other countries they trust more, then the utility loss they
suﬀer could be minimal. If that is not the case (and to our taste you cannot easily substitute
a French cheese with a Dutch one), then the welfare losses can be substantial. Only future
research will be able to tell.
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Countries of origin: Aus Bel UK Den NL Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Nor Por Spa Swe Average
Austria 3.56 2.95 2.61 2.95 2.95 2.94 2.62 3.09 2.52 2.55 2.43 3.00 2.50 2.58 3.05 2.82
Belgium 2.83 3.28 2.84 3.01 2.90 2.92 2.92 2.75 2.45 2.75 2.40 2.91 2.53 2.59 2.99 2.80
United Kingdom 2.89 2.91 3.29 3.13 3.16 2.98 2.32 2.62 2.54 2.61 2.51 3.06 2.74 2.47 3.03 2.82
Denmark 3.22 3.18 3.22 3.39 3.33 3.20 2.86 3.12 2.61 3.02 2.53 3.50 2.67 2.66 3.41 3.06
Netherland 2.90 3.18 3.00 3.29 3.28 3.25 2.72 2.84 2.59 2.80 2.35 3.30 2.74 2.64 3.34 2.95
Finland 3.29 3.07 3.18 3.30 3.14 3.69 2.92 2.89 2.68 2.92 2.51 3.48 2.67 2.61 3.35 3.05
France 2.70 3.07 2.55 2.96 2.94 2.91 3.18 2.74 2.53 2.72 2.43 2.97 2.59 2.68 2.99 2.80
Germany 2.98 2.84 2.69 2.97 2.90 2.85 2.85 3.50 2.51 2.59 2.36 2.92 2.48 2.66 2.99 2.81
Greece 2.32 2.60 2.34 2.56 2.55 2.42 2.78 2.31 3.21 2.55 2.33 2.40 2.60 2.71 2.51 2.55
Ireland 2.93 2.93 2.81 2.99 3.00 2.92 2.81 2.78 2.50 3.33 2.65 2.93 2.65 2.64 2.92 2.85
Italy 2.66 2.64 2.51 2.70 2.77 2.78 2.66 2.63 2.40 2.37 2.80 2.78 2.32 2.64 2.89 2.64
Norway . 3.18 3.27 3.53 3.26 . 2.93 2.99 2.52 3.01 2.65 . 2.60 2.56 . 2.95
Portugal 2.13 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.70 2.18 2.91 2.54 2.41 2.51 2.55 2.22 3.29 2.59 2.24 2.55
Spain 2.65 2.73 2.31 2.73 2.85 2.71 2.37 2.66 2.47 2.57 2.61 2.79 2.51 3.32 2.84 2.67
Sweden 3.53 3.23 3.43 3.57 3.33 3.49 3.04 3.13 2.88 3.26 2.81 3.65 2.97 2.86 3.59 3.25
Average 2.90 2.96 2.85 3.05 3.00 2.95 2.79 2.84 2.59 2.77 2.53 2.99 2.66 2.68 3.01
This table displays the average level of trust from citizens of country of origin (rows) to citizens of country of destination (columns). Trust is
calculated by taking the average response to the following question: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people
from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all.” The answers are




Panel A: Trust and control variables
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Average trust 0.06 0.04 0.30 -0.62 0.90 207
Log of distance 7.08 7.18 0.64 5.16 8.12 207
Common Border 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 207
Common Language 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.00 207
Same legal origin 0.27 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 207
Religious similarity 0.29 0.23 0.26 0.00 0.87 207
Genetic distance (FST values x10000) 73.66 63.00 54.80 9.00 289.00 207
Somatic distance 2.56 3.00 1.26 0.00 5.00 207
Fraction of years at war (1000-1970) 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.20 207
Linguistic common roots 0.51 0.50 0.24 0.00 0.94 180
Transportation costs 186.13 185.00 17.09 160.00 249.00 207
Press coverage 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.31 179
Panel B: Statistics of Canada
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Log of export to partner country 14.78 14.79 1.58 9.94 17.83 595
Average trust from importer to exporter 2.74 2.74 0.28 1.99 3.57 595
Press coverage 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.31 595
Log of distance 6.86 7.01 0.69 5.16 8.12 595
Common Border 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 595
Common Language 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 595
Religious similarity 0.33 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.87 595
Somatic distance 2.49 3.00 1.21 0.00 5.00 595
Same origin of the law 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 595
Transportation costs 5.19 5.18 0.08 5.08 5.52 595
Linguistic common roots 0.56 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.94 573
Correlation of consumption by industry 0.89 0.90 0.06 0.72 0.99 474
Panel C: OECD Foreign Direct Investment
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Outward stock of FDI (log) 21.10 21.40 2.14 12.42 24.18 439
Average trust from country to each partner 2.77 2.77 0.27 2.10 3.53 439
Press coverage 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.31 439
Log of distance 6.78 6.96 0.72 5.16 8.12 439
Common Border 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 439
Common Language 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 439
Same legal origin 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 439
Religious similarity 0.37 0.34 0.23 0.01 0.87 439
Somatic distance 2.67 3.00 1.27 0.00 5.00 439
Linguistic common roots 0.56 0.50 0.21 0.00 0.94 413
Transportation costs 5.18 5.15 0.09 5.08 5.52 439
31Panel D: Porfolio data (Morningstar)
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Percentage invested in partner country 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.14 108
Inverse Covariance of stock market returns -0.07 -0.04 0.15 -0.59 0.13 108
Common Border 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 108
Common Language 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 108
Log of distance 6.80 6.97 0.64 5.16 7.86 108
Press coverage 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.18 98
Average trust from investing country to partner 2.89 2.89 0.30 2.31 3.65 108
Religious similarity 0.31 0.29 0.25 0.01 0.87 108
Somatic distance 2.69 3.00 1.25 0.00 5.00 108
Distance in the characteristics of security laws (LLSV) 7.32 6.67 2.37 1.83 12.40 108
Linguistic common roots 0.63 0.67 0.13 0.50 0.94 89
Same legal origin 0.25 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 108
Panel A contains summary statistics for trust and for the bilateral controls. Trust is calculated by
taking the average response to the following question: “I would like to ask you a question about how
much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot
of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all”. The answers are coded in the following
way: =1 ( no trust at all), =2 (not very much trust), =3 (some trust), =4 (a lot of trust). The sample
statistics presented here for trust are obtained after collapsing the data by taking time averages (after
partialling out time eﬀects). Distance is the log distance between the capital of two countries. Common
border is a dummy variable equal to 1 if two countries share at least one border (it is coded 1, if countries
are the same). Common language is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the two countries share the same
oﬃcial language. Same legal origin is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if two countries share the
same origin of law (i.e., English, French, German, or Scandinavian), following the La Porta et al. (1998)
classiﬁcation. Religious similarity measures the fraction of people with the same religious faith in the two
countries. Genetic distance is the coancestry coeﬃcient (Reynolds, Weir, and Cockerham 1983) calculated
by Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza (1996). Somatic distance between two populations is based on
the distance between three anthropometric measures: heights, hair colors (pigmentation), and cephalic
index (Biasutti 1954). Number of years at war have been calculated using the current nations’ borders
as deﬁnition of the countries. Linguistic common roots is based on a count of the number of common
branches two languages share in the language trees as in Fearon (2003). Transportation costs between
pair of countries are calculated following Giuliano, Spilimbergo, and Tonon (2006) as the shipping quotes
in year 2006 collected by Import Export Wizard (IEW), a shipping company that calculates the surface
freight estimates of transportation costs in U.S. dollars for a “1000 kg unspeciﬁed freight type load
(including machinery, chemicals, etc.) with no special handling required, using the optimal combination
of going through land and water to transport the goods.” Press coverage is the number of times a
32country name appears in the headlines of the major newspaper in each country over the total number
of foreign news. Panel B shows summary statistics for the trade dataset. The data contains export
volume for a panel of 18 European Countries in the period between 1970 and 1996 (Source: Statistics
of Canada). The correlation of consumption between pairs of countries is obtained by correlating the
level of consumption by ISIC codes between country i and country j for years 1989-94 (Source: Nicita
and Olarreaga, 2007). Consumption in each ISIC code/country is deﬁned as GDP plus imports, minus
exports. Panel C shows summary statistics for the foreign direct investment data. Outward stock of FDI
(log) is from the OECD data and includes a panel between 1970 and 1996 of 18 European countries.
Panel D shows summary statistics for the portfolios datasets. The percentage invested in the partner
country is the net portfolio investment of a given country into another country deﬁned as the stock
of cross-border holdings of equities and long- and short-term debt securities valued at market prices
prevailing at the end of 2001 (from Morningstar data) divided by the sum of all foreign equity holdings
plus market capitalization-foreign liabilities. The inverse of the covariance of stock market returns is
calculated using monthly data for each country (DATASTREAM). Following Vlachos (2004), distance
in security law regulation is the sum of the absolute diﬀerence between the score in 21 characteristics
analyzed in La Porta, L´ opez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006).
33Table III:
Determinant of Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Common language 0.05 0.09* 0.11* 0.09* 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Log (distance) -0.11*** -0.04* -0.05* -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Common border -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Fraction of years at war (1000-1970) -1.16*** -1.07*** -1.16*** -1.07*** -1.16*** -1.26*** -1.26*** -1.07***
(0.29) (0.39) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
Religious similarity 0.15*** 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.11** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.15***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Somatic distance -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Genetic distance -10.00* 0.06
(5.94) (5.07)
Diﬀerences in GDP per capita (percentage) -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.09**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Same legal origin 0.07** 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Linguistic common roots 0.20* 0.20* 0.21*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)




Observations 207 207 207 207 207 207 180 180 154
R-squared 0.772 0.840 0.806 0.840 0.854 0.858 0.832 0.832 0.837
The dependent variable is the average trust across individuals of a given country toward citizens of other countries. To appropriately estimate
the standard errors, we ﬁrst regressed the observations on year ﬁxed eﬀects, then we took the residual and collapsed the observations by year. Trust
is calculated by taking the average response to the following question: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people
3
4from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all”. The answers are
coded in the following way: =1 (no trust at all), =2 (not very much trust), =3 (some trust), =4 (a lot of trust). All the other variables are reported
in the note of Table II. The regressions include country of origin and country of destination ﬁxed eﬀects. Spatial corrected standard error (see Conley




Eﬀect of Trust on Trade
OLS OLS OLS OLS IVGMM OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean trust of people in importing 0.36** 0.29* 0.25 0.34** 1.20*** 0.19
country to people in exporting country (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.22)
Interaction between trust and 0.83***
diversiﬁed good (0.05)
Common language 0.58*** 0.32** 0.37** 0.82*** 0.94*** 1.04***
(0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.21) (0.14) (0.27)
Log (distance) -0.31*** -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.57*** -0.61*** -0.73***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12)
Common border 0.49*** 0.43*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.35***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.13)
Press coverage 0.45 -0.03 -0.09 -1.34 -0.89 -2.83**
(1.05) (0.93) (0.94) (1.0) (0.60) (1.12)
Transportation costs -1.81** -0.33 -0.28 0.10 0.63 -1.83
(0.79) (0.74) (0.76) (0.73) (0.52) (1.17)
Same legal origin 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.57***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.15)
Linguistic common roots 0.09
(0.28)
Correlation of consumption -0.95 -1.05*** -1.82**
between the two countries (0.68) (0.37) (0.89)
Exporting country ﬁxed eﬀects*years YES YES YES YES YES YES
Importing country ﬁxed eﬀects*years YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 595 595 573 474 474 951
R-squared 0.964 0.969 0.970 0.968 0.849
Hansen J statistic 0.090
Chi-sq p-val 0.764
Test of excluded instruments: F(2,349) =59.66
The dependent variable is the log of the aggregate export volume from country i to country j, for a panel of 17 countries belonging to the
European Economic Area during the period 1970-1996. All the other variables are described in the note of Table II. All regressions include an
3
6interaction between ﬁxed eﬀects for the country of origin and year and for the destination country and year. All the columns, except column (5),
report OLS regressions where the standard errors are corrected for spatial correlation (Conley 1999). The speciﬁcation in column (5) is estimated
using the generalized method of moments instrumental variables estimator (GMM-IV). The instruments are religion diversity and somatic distance.
A test of overidentifying restrictions, Hansen’s “J” statistic (1982), is also reported for the instrumental variable regression. The test is calculated
from the ﬁrst stage residuals of the estimation procedure. We also report the F-test of the excluded instruments. The ﬁrst stage regressions are
reported in the online appendix of the paper. The symbols ***, **, and * mean that the coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from zero respectively at
the 1% , 5%, and 10% level.
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7Table V:
Eﬀect of Trust on Foreign Direct Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IVGMM
Mean trust toward 1.35*** 0.94* 0.70 0.84* 6.65***
people in destination country (0.51) (0.51) (0.48) (0.49) (1.24)
Common language 0.12 0.17 -0.57* -0.75** -2.05***
(0.31) (0.29) (0.30) (0.38) (0.43)
Log (distance) -0.46* -0.22 -0.48** -0.56** -0.70***
(0.26) (0.27) (0.23) (0.24) (0.26)
Common border 0.47** 0.44** 0.26 0.34 0.26
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
Press coverage 2.65 1.67 0.76 1.00 8.97***
(2.29) (2.18) (2.04) (2.24) (2.69)
Transportations costs -4.55** -0.23 -0.32 5.13**
(1.76) (1.66) (1.80) (2.31)
Common law 1.28*** 1.36*** 1.38***
(0.27) (0.31) (0.26)
Linguistic common roots -0.86 -2.41***
(0.55) (0.66)
Investing country ﬁxed eﬀects*years YES YES YES YES YES
Destination country ﬁxed eﬀects*years YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 445 445 445 419 419
R-squared 0.854 0.860 0.879 0.880
Hansen J statistic 0.031
Chi-sq p-val 0.859
Test of excluded F(2,328) =
instruments in ﬁrst stage: 24.34
The dependent variable is the log of outward investment (stocks) from the OECD data (1970–1996)
for 17 countries belonging to the European Economic Area. The independent variables are deﬁned in the
notes of Table II. All regressions include the interaction between ﬁxed eﬀects for the country of origin
and year and ﬁxed eﬀect for the destination country and year. All the columns, except column (5),
report OLS regressions where the standard errors are corrected for spatial correlation (Conley 1999).
The speciﬁcation in column (5) is estimated using the generalized method of moments instrumental
variables estimator (GMM-IV). The instruments are religion diversity and somatic distance. A test of
overidentifying restrictions, Hansen’s “J” statistic (1982), is also reported for the instrumental variable
regression. The test is calculated from the ﬁrst stage residuals of the estimation procedure. We also
report the F-test of the excluded instruments. The ﬁrst stage regressions are reported in the online
appendix of the paper. The standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for spatial correlation
(Conley 1999). The symbols ***, **, and * mean that the coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from zero
38respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
39Table VI:
Eﬀect of Trust on Portfolio Investment
Table VI:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IVGMM
Mean trust toward 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.04 0.15*** 0.09** 0.27**
people in destination country (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
Inverse Cov. of stock market returns 0.01 -0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.01
of country of origin and destination (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Common language 0.02 -0.02 -0.05* -0.02 -0.01 -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log (distance) -0.06** -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Common border -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05* -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Press coverage 0.63** 0.30 0.67** 0.57** 0.90***
(0.25) (0.20) (0.26) (0.26) (0.33)
Same legal origin 0.08***
(0.02)
Distance in security law regulation*100 0.42 0.86*** 0.85***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.30)
Linguistic common roots 0.14*** 0.03
(0.05) (0.08)
Observations 108 98 98 98 80 80
R-squared 0.371 0.402 0.519 0.412 0.407
Hansen J statistic 2.277
Chi-sq p-val 0.131
Test of excluded F(2,44)=
instruments in ﬁrst stage: 10.18
The dependent variable measures the percentage of net portfolio investment of a given country into
another country. Speciﬁcally, the dependent variable is the stock of cross-border holdings of equities
and long- and short-term debt securities valued at market prices prevailing at the end of 2001 (from
Morningstar data) divided by the sum of all foreign equity holdings plus market capitalization- of foreign
liabilities. The sample includes all European Union countries. Independent variables are described in
the note of Table II. All regressions include ﬁxed eﬀects for the country of origin and for the destination
country. All the columns, except column (6), report OLS regressions where the standard errors are
corrected for spatial correlation (Conley 1999). The speciﬁcation in column (6) is estimated using the
generalized method of moments instrumental variables estimator (GMM-IV). The instruments are religion
diversity and somatic distance. A test of overidentifying restrictions, Hansen’s “J” statistic (1982), is
also reported for the instrumental variable regression. The test is calculated from the ﬁrst stage residuals
40of the estimation procedure. We also report the F-test of the excluded instruments. The ﬁrst stage
regressions are reported in the online appendix of the paper. The symbols ***, **, and * mean that the
coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from zero respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
41Figure I
Fixed Eﬀects of Country of Origin and Destination Relative to Ireland
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